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Abstract 
We argue that logical semantics might have faltered due to 
its failure in distinguishing between two fundamentally very 
different types of concepts: ontological concepts, that 
should be types in a strongly-typed ontology, and logical 
concepts, that are predicates corresponding to properties of 
and relations between objects of various ontological types. 
We will then show that accounting for these differences 
amounts to the integration of lexical and compositional se-
mantics in one coherent framework, and to an embedding in 
our logical semantics of a strongly-typed ontology that re-
flects our commonsense view of the world and the way we 
talk about it in ordinary language. We will show that in such 
a framework a number of challenges in natural language 
semantics can be adequately and systematically treated. 
 Introduction  
In the concluding remarks of Ontological Promiscuity 
Hobbs (1985) made what we believe to be a very insightful 
observation: given that semantics is an attempt at specify-
ing the relation between language and the world, if “one 
can assume a theory of the world that is isomorphic to the 
way we talk about it … then semantics becomes nearly 
trivial”. But how exactly can we rectify our logical formal-
isms so that semantics, an endeavor that has occupied the 
most penetrating minds for over two centuries, can become 
(nearly) trivial, and what exactly does it mean „to assume a 
theory of the world‟ in our semantics? 
 In this paper we hope to provide answers for both ques-
tions. First, we believe that a commonsense theory of the 
world can (and should) be embedded in our semantic for-
malisms resulting in a logical semantics grounded in com-
monsense metaphysics. Furthermore, we believe that the 
first step to accomplishing this vision starts by rectifying 
what we think was a crucial oversight in logical semantics, 
namely the failure to distinguish between two fundamen-
tally different types of concepts: ontologica1l concepts, 
that are types in a strongly-typed ontology; and logical 
concepts, that are predicates corresponding to properties 
of and relations between objects of various ontological 
types. This differentiation, as we hope to show, results in a 
natural linking between ordinary spoken language and 
commonsense knowledge about the world we talk about1. 
In particular, by embedding ontological types in our predi-
cates type unification and other type operations can then be 
used to „uncover‟ missing information – information that is 
never explicitly stated in everyday discourse, but is often 
implicitly assumed as shared background knowledge. 
 In the next section we briefly discuss the phenomenon of 
the „missing text‟, which is behind most challenges in the 
semantics of natural language. We will then suggest how 
accounting for the difference between logical and ontolog-
ical concepts coupled with type unification over predicates 
embedded with ontological types can help us „uncover‟ this 
missing text. Subsequently, it will be shown how in such a 
framework a number of challenges in the semantics of nat-
ural language can be adequately and uniformly treated. Fi-
nally, we will briefly discuss the nature of the strongly-
typed ontological structure that will be assumed throughout 
the paper and argue that this structure cannot be „invented‟ 
but should be „discovered‟, briefly making some sugges-
tions on how this might be accomplished. 
The Phenomenon of the ‘Missing Text’ 
Perhaps for computational effectiveness, as Givon (1984) 
once suggested, in using ordinary spoken language to ex-
press our thoughts we tend to do so by using the least pos-
sible effort; by, for one thing, uttering the least number of 
words that are needed to convey a particular thought. Thus, 
for example, we make statements such as: 
 
(1)  a.  Simon is a rock.   
 b.  The ham sandwich wants a beer.   
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper reference to a „commonsense theory of the world‟ 
is a reference to the commonsense knowledge required in the language 
understanding process (as performed by a 5-year old), and not to special-
ized domain knowledge that one would need in general problem solving.  
 c.  Sheba is articulate.   
 d.  Jon bought a brick house.   
 e.  Carlos likes to play bridge.   
 f.   Jon visited a house on every street. 
 g.  Jon has Das Kapital but he never read it. 
 
In our opinion, speakers (hearers) of ordinary language ut-
ter (understand) these sentences to convey (mean) the fol-
lowing, respectively: 
 
(2)  a.  Simon is [as solid as] a rock.   
 b.  The [person eating the] ham sandwich wants a beer.   
 c.  Sheba is [an] articulate [person].   
 d.  Jon bought a brick [-made] house.   
 e.  Carlos likes to play [the game] bridge.   
 f.   Jon visited a [different] house on every street. 
 g.  Jon has [the book] Das Kapital but he never read 
        it[‟s content]. 
 
Clearly, any viable semantic formalism must somehow 
„uncover‟ and account for this [missing text], as such sen-
tences are quite common and are not at all exotic, or 
farfetched. In this regard, we are in total agreement with 
Levesque (2011), who states that in order to comprehend 
such sentences, “you need to have background knowledge 
that is not expressed in the words of the sentence to be able 
to sort out what is going on … And it is precisely bringing 
this background knowledge to bear that we informally call 
thinking” (emphasis in original)2. However, and although 
these sentences seem to have a common denominator, it is 
somewhat surprising that in looking at the literature one 
finds that these phenomena have been studied quite inde-
pendently and in many cases with incompatible proposals 
that are individually tailored to a specific phenomenon, 
such as metaphor (2a); metonymy (2b); textual entailment 
(2c); nominal compounds (2d); lexical ambiguity (2e), 
quantifier scope ambiguity (2f); reference resolution and 
salient meanings (2g); and copredication (2h), to name a 
few. In recent years, however, there has been quite a bit of 
work to deal with some instances of this phenomenon by 
incorporating type systems in logical semantics. For exam-
ple, in a series of papers (see e.g. Lou, 2011; Lou, 2011; 
Lou 2012) Lou introduced a type system based on Martin-
Lof‟s type theory (Martin-Lof, 1984) where common 
nouns are considered to be types, and where it is shown 
how the machinery of type coercion can in such a system 
handle lexical disambiguation and accommodate for co-
predication; where the latter refers to situations where we 
have a „structured object‟ (or a dot-type) object that can be 
predicated in different ways in the same context (see 
Pustojosky, 1995). An example of this is given in (3), 
where there is a reference to the PHYSICAL-OBJECT sense of 
                                                 
2 Note that the only plausible explanation to the fact that we all tend to 
leave out the same information is that the background knowledge needed 
to comprehend such sentences must be shared. 
„book‟ (when being bought) and to the INFORMATIONAL-
CONTENT aspect of book (when being read): 
 
(3)  John bought and read the latest book on deep learning 
 
While we are sympathetic to the general approach of Lou, 
we believe that copredication and lexical ambiguity are 
part of a single and much simpler phenomenon (which we 
will shortly get into), and thus we believe that type coer-
cion introduces complex machinery unnecessarily, not to 
mention that type shifting/coercing will not always pro-
duce the desired results. The same observation can be 
made about the work of Asher and Pustejovsky (2012) 
where complex machinery that permits type shifting is also 
used to access different aspects (senses) of a structured ob-
ject (a dot-type) using the lexical constraints available in 
the context. The problem we have with this approach is 
that the notion of the dot-type does not seem to be cogni-
tively plausible since language allows us to refer to many 
aspects of a given object that cannot all be a priori defined 
as part of the lexical semantics.  Moreover, and more spe-
cific to the work of Lou, we argue that there is in fact a 
technical problem in assuming that the entire class of 
common nouns should constitute the types in the system. 
Consider for example the sentence in (4). 
 
(4) John is an excellent teacher 
 
Clearly „excellent‟ in (4) does not describe John, but his 
teaching activity (formally, John is excellent does not fol-
low from John is an excellent teacher), and thus it is the 
hidden teaching activity that is the ontological type 
here, and not the common noun, „teacher‟3.  
Starting with (Asher, 2008; Asher, 2011) and more re-
cently in (Asher, 2015), Asher has also developed over a 
few years a type system that uses type coercion to account 
for lexical disambiguation as well as to handle situations 
involving copredication. While the same reservations we 
have regarding the approach taken by Lou (2012) more or 
less apply to the earlier work of Asher, the more recent 
Asher (2015) however correctly highlights the technical 
problems in simply performing type shifting (or type coer-
cion), and in particular in examples such as those in (5).  
 
(5) Julie enjoyed a book. It was a mystery  
 
If a straightforward type shifting is performed on the first 
sentence, so that the type constraints imposed by „enjoy‟ 
(which expects an eventuality) are satisfied, then the sub-
sequent sentence cannot be correctly interpreted as we 
would have lost, so to speak, the physical object sense of 
book that is the obvious referent of „it‟. Asher concludes, 
and correctly so, in our opinion, that it is not type shifting 
                                                 
3 The same argument applies to situations where the common noun refers 
to an event, a state, a property, etc. (more on this below) 
a.  voted for independence 
b.  lost to Real Madrid 
c.  announced a curfew 
of book that must occur, but that some process in predicate 
composition must occur. That process, which Asher (2015) 
calls „transformation‟, is essentially a functor that „picks-
up‟ the desired object that can semantically link to the 
verb‟s argument. We are in general agreement with the 
spirit of this approach (as nothing else will work, for one 
thing), but we have two reservations. For one thing, this 
„transformation‟ operation is not very clear, especially in 
how it picks-up different kinds of objects, for example, an 
EVENTUALITY (that is a „reading‟) in (6) and an INFORMA-
TIONAL CONTENT object in (7): 
 
(6) Julie enjoyed the book.   
 Julie enjoyed reading the book.  
(7) Julie criticized the book.   
 Julie criticized the content of the book. 
 
Moreover, and if types are meant to be a set of general cat-
egories (e.g. PHYSICAL-OBJECT, INFORMATIONAL-CONTENT, 
ANIMATE, etc.), it is not clear how it can be determined in 
(8) that it was Barcelona‟s residents who voted for inde-
pendence (8a), that it was Barcelona‟s team that lost to Re-
al Madrid (8b), and that it was Barcelona‟s governing body 
that announced a curfew (8c). 
 
 
(8) Barcelona was calm after it 
 
 
The reason the highly general (and somewhat ad-hoc) type 
system is potentially problematic is that the missing terms 
in (8) (VOTERS, SPORTS-TEAM, GOVERNING-BODY) are, at a 
high level, of a similar type, namely some „group of peo-
ple‟ and thus for our pragmatics to work it must operate at 
a much more granular level.  
In summary, we want to point out that recent efforts to 
incorporate type-theory in compositional semantics, thus 
integrating lexical semantics (and commonsense metaphys-
ics) with compositional semantics is a welcoming trend, 
and the pioneering work of Pustejovsky (2012), Lou 
(2011) and Asher (2015) are efforts in the right direction. 
However, and as will be suggested below, these specific 
proposals to treat a few phenomenon in the semantics of 
natural language seem to be ad-hoc and do not address the 
more general problem of how in the process of language 
understanding we seem to be able to uncover all the im-
plicitly assumed but missing information. In the rest of this 
paper we will offer an alternative approach that we believe 
will answer this question. In particular, we will argue that 
most of the challenges in the semantics of natural language 
(lexical disambiguation, copredication, metonymy, etc.) 
are due to the phenomena of the „missing text‟ - infor-
mation that is never explicitly stated but is often implicitly 
assumed as shared background knowledge. As such, we 
will show that uncovering such information requires recti-
fying a crucial oversight in logical semantics, namely the 
uniform use of predication to represent two fundamentally 
different types of concepts: ontological concepts (that rep-
resent types in a strongly-typed ontology) and logical con-
cepts (that are properties of and relations between objects 
of various ontological types).  
Ontological vs. Logical Concepts 
Before we start with our proposal, let us briefly suggest 
where we believe the standard logical treatment of natural 
language semantics might have faltered. Consider the sen-
tences in (9) and their translations to standard first-order 
predicate logic in (10). 
 
(9)  a.  Julie is an articulate person 
  b.  Julie is articulate 
(10)  a.  PERSON(julie)  ARTICULATE(julie) 
  b.  ARTICULATE(julie) 
 
We argue that, from a cognitive and a commonsense point 
of view, the translation of (9a) to that of (10a) is problem-
atic. First, note that (9a) and (9b) have, more or less, the 
same cognitive content, and thus (10a) and (10b) must ac-
cordingly have more or less the same truth value condi-
tions. But that effectively means that the truth value of AR-
TICULATE(julie) is only meaningful if PERSON(julie) is con-
sidered to be true a priori. Stated in other words this means 
that ARTICULATE(julie) is meaningful only if Julie is as-
sumed a priori to be an object of type person. Since a  b  
b  a this sequential order is not captured in (10a), howev-
er. The problem in our opinion is that PERSON is not a pred-
icate, but a type that is presupposed by the logical concept 
(the property) ARTICULATE. Thus, we argue that the proper 
translation of both sentences in (9) is the one given in (11). 
 
(11)  (julie :: person)(ARTICULATE(julie)) 
 
That is, the proper translation is one that states that „there 
is an object named julie, an object of type person, such 
that the property ARTICULATE is true of julie. In the next 
section we expand on this idea in more details. 
Types vs. Predicates 
In Types and Ontology Fred Sommers (1963) suggested 
years ago that there is a strongly typed ontology (that he 
termed „the language tree‟) that seems to be implicit in all 
that we say in ordinary spoken language, where two ob-
jects x and y are considered to be of the same type iff the 
set of monadic predicates that are significantly (that is, tru-
ly or falsely but not absurdly) predicable of x is equivalent 
to the set of predicates that are significantly predicable of 
y. Thus, for example, while the noun phrases in (12) make 
reference to two distinct sets of objects, for an ontologist 
interested in the relationship between ontology and lan-
guage, the noun phrases in (12) are ultimately referring to 
one type only, namely cat: 
 
(12)   a. an old cat 
b. a black cat 
 
In other words, whether we make a reference to an old cat 
or to a black cat, in both instances we are ultimately speak-
ing of objects that are of the same type; and this, according 
to Sommers, is a reflection of the fact that the set of mo-
nadic predicates in our natural language that are signifi-
cantly predicable of „old cats‟ is exactly the same set that is 
significantly predicable of „black cats‟ (or, whatever can 
sensibly be said of black cats can also be sensibly said of 
old cats, and vice versa). In this sense, a concept such as 
OLD is a predicate that happens to be predicable of a con-
cept such as cat, which corresponds to a type in a strong-
ly-typed ontology. As such, we take the proper logical rep-
resentation for the noun phrase in (13) to be that in (13b), 
and not the one in (13a). 
 
(13)   〚an adorable cat〛 
   a.   P[(x)(CAT(x)  ADORABLE(x)  P(x))] 
   b.   P[(x :: cat)(ADORABLE(x)  P(x))] 
 
That is, an adorable cat refers to some object of type cat, 
a cat that, presumably, is adorable4. Note also that abstract 
objects, such as events, states, properties, are also types in 
the ontology that can be predicated, as shown in (14).  
 
(14)   〚an imminent event〛  
 P[(x :: event)(IMMINENT(x)  P(x))] 
 
   〚an idle state〛  P[(x :: state)(IDLE(x)  P(x))] 
    
〚a desirable property〛  
 P[(x :: property)(DESIRABLE(x)  P(x))] 
 
In our representation, therefore, we assume a Platonic uni-
verse that includes everything we talk about in our lan-
guage, and where concepts belong to two quite distinct cat-
egories: (i) ontological concepts, such as animal, sub-
stance, entity, artifact, book, event, state, etc., 
which are types in a subsumption hierarchy, and where the 
fact that an object of type human is (ultimately) an object 
of type entity is expressed as human  entity; and (ii) 
logical concepts, such as FORMER, OLD, IMMINENT, BEAU-
TIFUL, etc., which are the properties (that can be said) of 
and the relations (that can hold) between ontological con-
                                                 
4 As Hacking (2001) suggests one can think of the type as cat the kind of 
object that answers a question such as „What-is-it?‟ The distinction be-
tween types and predicates is thus related to the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion, where the truth of a type judgment such as (sheba::cat) is a synthet-
ic judgment the truth of which is determined by virtue of what we know 
about the world; while the truth of the judgment WILD(sheba::cat) is de-
termined by virtue of the meaning of „wild‟. As such, and while currently 
popular data-driven approaches to natural language are in our opinion to-
tally misguided, type judgments like (x::cat) probably do belong to the 
quantitative level in that the truth of the type judgment (x::cat) could be 
determined by pattern recognition systems, including type judgments of 
abstract objects (does some event „look like‟ a dancing event, etc.) 
cepts. The following are examples that illustrate the differ-
ence between logical and ontological concepts:  
 
(15) R1:  OLD(x :: entity) 
R2:  HEAVY(x :: physical) 
R3:  HUNGRY(x :: living) 
R4:  ARTICULATE(x :: human) 
R5:  MAKE(x :: human, y :: artifact) 
R6:  MANUFACTURE(x :: human, y :: instrument) 
R7:  RIDE(x :: human, y :: vehicle) 
R8:  DRIVE(x :: human, y :: car) 
 
The predicates in (15) are supposed to reflect the fact that 
in ordinary spoken language we can say OLD of any enti-
ty; that we say HEAVY of objects that are of type physi-
cal; that HUNGRY is said of objects that are of type liv-
ing; that ARTICULATE is said of objects that must be of 
type human; that make is a relation that can hold between 
a human and an artifact; that MANUFACTURE is a rela-
tion that can hold between a human and an instrument, 
etc. Note that the type assignments in (15) implicitly define 
a type hierarchy as that shown in figure 1 below. Conse-
quently, and although not explicitly stated in (15), in ordi-
nary spoken language one can always attribute the property 
HEAVY to an object of type car since car  vehicle  
physical
5. In addition to logical and ontological con-
cepts, there are also proper nouns, which are the names of 
objects that could be of any type. A proper noun, such as 
Sheba, for example, is interpreted as follows 〚Sheba〛  
P[(
1
Sheba :: thing)(P(x))].   
 
Figure 1. The type hierarchy implied by (15) 
                                                 
5 It should be noted here that the expressions in (15) are assumed to refer 
to a specific sense of each predicate. In general, however, the type as-
signment is a set of possible types where a single type is eventually left 
after lexical disambiguation. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
A point worth mentioning at this early juncture is that be-
sides the embedding of „commonsense‟ constraints in our 
predicates, what implicitly gets defined by applying Som-
mers‟ predicability test, as given by (15), is the implicit de-
termination of „saliency‟. For example, and while it makes 
sense to speak of human objects that MAKE, RIDE and 
DRIVE objects of type car, DRIVE is a more salient relation 
between a human and a car since a human rides a car as a 
vehicle, and makes a car as an artifact, but s/he 
drives a car explicitly as a car (see figure 2).  
Type Unification 
Let us now start our „compositional‟ semantics. Consider 
the interpretation of Sheba is a thief where we assume 
THIEF is a property that is ordinarily said of objects that 
must be of type human, that is THIEF(x :: human): 
 
(16)   〚Sheba is a thief〛   
     (
1
Sheba :: thing)(THIEF(Sheba :: human)) 
 
Thus, Sheba is a thief is interpreted as: there is a unique 
object named Sheba and initially assumed to be of type 
thing, such that the property THIEF is true of Sheba6.  
 
 
Figure 2. Salient relations implied by types and their properties. 
 
 
Note now that in (16) Sheba is associated with more than 
one type in a single scope. In these situations a type unifi-
cation must occur, where a type unification (s ● t) be-
tween types s and t and where Q {,} is defined, for 
now, as follows: 
 
(17)   
 (    (    ))( ( )) 

{
 
 
 
  (     )( ( ))                                     (     )
 (     )( ( ))                                      (    )
 (     ) (     )( ( )  ( ))      ( )(     (   ))
                                                                        
 
                   
                                                 
6 For simplicity, we are ignoring for now some intermediate steps in the 
translation, especially as it relates to the copula „is‟ (more on this below). 
where msr(s,t) stands for the most salient relation between 
objects of type s and objects of type t. That is, in situa-
tions where there is no subsumption relation between S and 
t the type unification results in keeping the variables of 
both types and in introducing some salient relation between 
the two types (we will discuss these situations below). Go-
ing to back to (16), the type unification in this case is actu-
ally quite simple, since (human   thing): 
 
(18)   〚Sheba is a thief〛  
 (
1
Sheba :: thing)(THIEF(Sheba :: human)) 
 (
1
Sheba :: (thing ● human))(THIEF(Sheba)) 
(
1
Sheba :: human)(THIEF(Sheba)) 
 
In the final analysis, therefore, Sheba is a thief is interpret-
ed as follows: there is a unique object named Sheba, an ob-
ject that eventually came out to be of type human, such 
that THIEF is true of Sheba. Note the clear distinction be-
tween ontological concepts (e.g., human), which Cocchi-
arella (2001) calls first-intension concepts, and logical (or 
second-intension) concepts, such as THIEF(x :: human). In 
accordance with Quine‟s famous dictum (“to be is to be the 
value of a variable”), what (18) says is that what ontologi-
cally exist are objects of type human, and not thieves, and 
THIEF is an accidental (as well as temporal, etc.) property 
that we came to use to talk of certain objects of type hu-
man. Furthermore, it is assumed that a logical concept such 
as THIEF is defined by a logical expression such as (x :: 
human)(THIEF(x)  ), where the exact nature of  might 
very well be susceptible to temporal, cultural, and other 
contextual factors depending on what, at a certain point in 
time, a certain community considers a THIEF to be.  
It should also be noted that a first-intension such as (x :: 
human) as well as a second-intension such as ARTICU-
LATE(x :: human) are both „judgments‟ where the former is 
a type judgment and the latter is a value judgment. As 
such, for a judgment such as ARTICULATE(x :: human) to be 
made, the type judgment (x :: human) must first be made. 
The way we see it, therefore, is that type judgments are the 
first level in the overall semantic structure, as shown in 
figure 3. 
More on Type Unification 
Consider the following interpretation of Sara owns a black 
cat, where we assume that BLACK can be said of objects of 
type physical, and that the OWN relationship holds be-
tween objects of type human and objects of type entity: 
 
(19)   〚Sara owns a black cat〛  
 (
1
Sheba ::thing)(c::cat) 
      (BLACK(c :: physical) 
      OWN(Sara :: human, c :: entity)) 
 
Thus Sara owns a black cat is initially interpreted as: there 
is a unique thing named Sara and an object c of type cat  
  
 
 
Figure 3. Levels of understanding 
 
 
 
such that c is BLACK (and thus in this context it must be of 
type physical), and Sara owns c, where in this context 
Sara must be object of type human and c an object of type 
entity. Depending on the context they are mentioned in, 
therefore, Sara and c are assigned different types. The type 
unifications that must occur in this situation are the follow-
ing (where „‟ means „unifies to‟): 
 
(Sara :: (thing ● human))  (Sara :: human) 
(c :: ((physical ● entity) ● cat)) 
 (c :: (physical ● cat)) 
 (c :: cat) 
 
The final interpretation of Sara owns a black cat is finally 
given by the following: 
 
(20)   〚Sara owns a black cat〛  
      (
1
Sheba::human)(c::cat)(BLACK(c)  OWN(Sara,c)) 
 
That is, there is unique object named Sara, which is of type 
human, and some object c of type cat, where c is BLACK 
and Sara owns c.  
Type Unification and Abstract Objects 
As discussed above, logical concepts such as TEACHER, 
THIEF, etc. are assumed to be defined by some logical ex-
pression. A plausible definition for a logical concept such 
as DANCER could for example be given by (21). 
 
(21)  (x::human) 
(DANCER(x)  (a::dancing)(AGENT(a,x)) 
 
That is, any x (that must be of type human) is a DANCER iff 
x is the agent of some dancing (a subtype activity). 
Let us now consider the interpretation of Olga is a beauti-
ful dancer where we assume BEAUTIFUL(a::entity) – i.e., 
„beautiful‟ is a property that can be said of any entity: 
 
(22)   〚Olga is a beautiful dancer〛  
(
1
Olga :: thing)(
1
a :: dancing) 
    (AGENT(a :: activity, Olga :: human)  
     (BEAUTIFUL(Olga::entity)  BEAUTIFUL(a::entity))) 
 
Thus, Olga is a beautiful dancer is initially translated as 
follows: there is a unique thing named Olga, and some 
dancing a, where Olga is the agent of a, which must be 
an activity (and as the agent, Olga must be of type hu-
man), and where either Olga is beautiful or her dancing 
(or, of course, both). Note now that Olga and a are as-
signed three types in the same scope, triggering the follow-
ing type unifications: 
 
(Olga :: ((thing ● entity) ● human)) 
 (Olga :: (entity ● human))  (Olga :: human) 
 
(a :: ((dancing ● activity) ● entity))  
 (a :: (dancing ● entity))  (a :: dancing) 
 
Concerning the disjunction term in (14), representing the 
ambiguity in nominal modification, we now have the fol-
lowing BEAUTIFUL(Olga :: human)  BEAUTIFUL(a :: danc-
ing)). Since both terms in the disjunction are acceptable, 
the final translation, admitting the ambiguity in the nomi-
nal modification, is the one given in (23). 
 
(23)  〚Olga is a beautiful dancer〛   
 (
1
Olga :: human)(a :: dancing) 
(AGENT(a,Olga)  (BEAUTIFUL(Olga)  BEAUTIFUL(a))) 
 
Unlike the situation in (23), however, the relevant type uni-
fications should remove the ambiguities in (24) and (25),  
 
(24)  Olga is an experienced dancer 
(25)  Olga is a recreational dancer 
 
where it is clear that experienced is describing Olga in the 
former and recreational is describing Olga‟s dancing in the 
latter. The term we need to reconsider here is the term in-
volving the disjunction representing the ambiguity in nom-
inal modification. The type unifications in the case of (24): 
 
EXPERIENCED(Olga :: (human ● human)) 
      EXPERIENCED(a :: (dancing ● human))   
 EXPERIENCED(Olga :: human)  EXPERIENCED(a ::  ) 
 EXPERIENCED(Olga :: human)    
 EXPERIENCED(Olga :: human) 
 
The type unification admitting an „experienced dancing‟ 
fails here, leaving „experienced‟ to unambiguously modify 
Olga. In (25), however, we have the following: 
 
RECREATIONAL(Olga :: (human ● dancing)) 
 RECREATIONAL(a :: (dancing ● dancing))   
 RECREATIONAL(Olga ::  )  RECREATIONAL(a::dancing) 
     RECREATIONAL (a :: dancing) 
 RECREATIONAL(a :: dancing) 
 
Note that in this case „recreational Olga‟ was eliminated 
leaving „recreational‟ to unambiguously modify Olga‟s 
dancing. A valid question here is this: why was the type 
unification (dancing ● human) in (24) and (25) consid-
ered a failure (resulting in  ), although the definition of 
type unification given in (17) suggests that in the absence 
of a subsumption relation an attempt is first made is to 
pick-up the „most salient relation‟ (msr) between the two 
ontological types. The answer is that looking for an msr 
occurs when all else locally fails, while this is not the case 
in (24) and (25) where the context provided a successful 
type unification and thus looking elsewhere to „make 
sense‟ of what is being said was not needed! 
An Innate Ontological Structure? 
A longstanding subject of debate in linguistics is the phe-
nomenon of adjective-ordering restrictions (AORs), which 
is concerned with the apparent preferred adjective order-
ings we tend to have when multiple adjectives are used in a 
sequence. For example, it is generally agreed that the or-
dering of adjectives in (26a) is preferred to that in (26b).  
 
(26)   a.  Jon bought a beautiful red car 
b.  Jon bought a red beautiful car 
 
What makes this an interesting phenomenon from a cogni-
tive science point of view is the apparent universality and 
cross-linguistic nature of AORs, as well as the fact that 
children seem to effortlessly make these preferences with-
out ever being instructed on what the most „natural‟ order-
ing is. Various studies have suggested that these ordering 
preferences might be a function of some syntactic and se-
mantic classes of adjectives (e.g., Cinque 1994; Larson, 
1998; and Vendler, 1968), nouniness – how close is the ad-
jective to a noun, or temporariness (how much does the ad-
jective encode a temporary property) (e.g., Teodorescu, 
2006). Despite all these studies, the debate as to what 
might explain these ordering preferences, and whether the 
ordering preferences might reflect a much deeper cognitive 
phenomenon, have not yet been settled. What we like to 
suggest here is that adjective-ordering restrictions, are re-
lated to type casting in a strongly-typed ontological struc-
ture. For example, the adjective orderings in (27a) and 
(27b) require the following type unifications: 
 
(27)   a.  BEAUTIFUL(RED(x :: physical) :: entity) 
b.  RED(BEAUTIFUL(x :: entity) :: physical) 
 
Note that the type unification in (27a) requires a type cast-
ing from physical to entity, while the one in (27b) re-
quires a type casting in the reverse order. The type casting 
in (27b) should be blocked, however, since (as it is well 
known in type theory of programming languages) one can 
always perform type casting upwards, but not downwards7.  
What is interesting to contemplate here is this: if the ad-
jective-ordering restriction phenomenon (which seems to 
be universally and cross-linguistically valid) turns out to be 
                                                 
7 Technically, we can always generalize by ignoring specific details; 
casting down (assuming unknown details), is however undecidable. 
explainable by type casting and unification in a strongly-
type ontological structure, it would suggest that the onto-
logical structure we envision might have some innate un-
derpinnings, as recent psycholinguistic research seems to 
suggest that this might be the case (Scontras et. al., 2017). 
Interaction between Type Casting and Unification 
Recall the interpretation of Olga is a beautiful dancer in 
(23), where the final interpretation admitted the ambiguity 
in nominal modification where all type unifications suc-
ceeded, allowing „beautiful‟ to remain ambiguous in that it 
could be modifying Olga or her dancing. Consider now the 
interpretation of Olga is a beautiful tall dancer, where we 
assume TALL(x :: physical): 
 
(28)   〚Olga is a beautiful tall dancer〛   
           (
1
Olga :: thing)(a :: dancing) 
              (AGENT(a :: activity, Olga :: human)  
                  (BEAUTIFUL(TALL(Olga :: physical) :: entity)  
              BEAUTIFUL(tall(a :: physical) :: entity))) 
 
The type relevant unifications here are the following, 
 
(Olga :: ((thing ● physical) ● human)) 
 (Olga :: (physical ● human)) 
 (Olga :: human) 
 
(a :: ((dancing ● activity) :: physical))  
 (a :: (dancing ● physical)) 
 (a ::  ) 
   
 
resulting in (29): 
 
(29) 〚Olga is a beautiful tall dancer〛  
(
1
Olga :: human)(a :: dancing)(AGENT(a,Olga) 
 (BEAUTIFUL(TALL(Olga :: physical)) 
                        BEAUTIFUL(TALL(a ::  ) :: entity)))  
 
(
1
Olga :: human)(a :: dancing) 
               (AGENT(a,Olga)  (BEAUTIFUL(TALL(Olga))   ))  
 
(
1
Olga :: human)(a :: dancing) 
       (AGENT(a,Olga)  BEAUTIFUL(TALL(Olga))) 
 
Unlike the situation in (23), where „beautiful‟ could be de-
scribing Olga or her dancing, the situation in (29) is quite 
different due to the adjective „tall‟ that cast the type of 
„beautiful‟ to a physical, an thus to describe Olga, and 
not her dancing. We leave it to the reader to work out why 
(and how) Olga is a beautiful tall dancer sounds fine, 
while Olga is a tall beautiful dancer sounds awkward 
(hint: in the latter, the type castings and type unifications 
reduce the entire disjunction to  ). 
Where Logical Semantics Can (Should?) Go 
In this section we show how the embedding of ontological 
concepts in our predicates can help us tackle some well-
known challenges in the semantics of natural language.  
Lexical Disambiguation 
Thus far we have been assuming single type assignments 
to predicates variables, e.g.  BLACK(x :: physical), as it 
was implicitly assumed that the predicate in question has 
been disambiguated – that is, that a specific meaning of the 
predicate has been selected. We will continue to do so 
where the context is clear, although we will show hear how 
lexical disambiguation itself is conducted in our system, 
and that requires that we initially consider, for some terms, 
a set of type assignments.  
 Let us consider the interpretation of the sentence in (30), 
where we assume „party‟ has two meanings: the „social 
event‟ and the „political group‟. 
 
(30)  〚Jon cancelled the party〛  
   (
1
Jon :: thing)(a :: activity) 
      (
1
p::politicalGroup, socialEvent) 
    (CANCELLATION(a)  SUBJECT(a, Jon :: human)) 
       OBJECT(a, p :: event)) 
 
Note that, initially, the type associated with „the party‟ p is 
a set of all possible types (again, for simplicity we assumed 
that „cancelled‟ has been disambiguated where it was de-
termined that it is some activity the object of which is of 
type event). The type unifications for Jon are straight-
forward: (Jon :: (human ● thing))  (Jon :: human). The 
type unifications that must occur for p, however, are now a 
set of n pairs of type unifications, where n is the number of 
possible meanings of p: 
 
(p::(event ● politicalGroup), (event ● socialEvent)) 
 (p ::  , socialEvent) 
 (p :: socialEvent) 
 
Thus, the initial set of types is reduced to a singleton and 
the „party‟ that Jon seems to have cancelled is a „social 
event‟. Note that if „cancelled‟ in (30) was replaced by „as-
sisted‟, then the correct meaning of „party‟ will also be se-
lected, namely the meaning of the political group. On the 
other hand, if „cancelled‟ where to be replaced by „promot-
ed‟ then we would have a genuinely ambiguous statement, 
since one can „promote‟ a political group, as well as a so-
cial event, as illustrated by (31). 
 
(31)  〚Jon promoted the party〛  
      (1Jon :: thing)(a :: activity) 
       (1p :: politicalGroup, socialEvent) 
      (PROMOTION(a)  SUBJECT(a, Jon :: human)) 
           OBJECT(a, p :: entity)) 
 
Assuming that any entity can be promoted, and in the 
absence of any additional information both assumed mean-
ings of „party‟ remain to be equally plausible.   
Metonymy, Copredication and Salient Meanings 
Consider the sentence in (32), where two senses of „book‟ 
are assumed to be used in the same context, the informa-
tional content sense of book (when being read) and the 
physical object sense (when being burned): 
 
(32)  Jon read the book and then he burned it. 
 
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that „book‟ 
must have what is called a dot type, which is a structured 
object that in a sense carries the „informational content‟ 
sense (which is referenced when it is being read) as well as 
the „physical object‟ sense (which is referenced when it is 
being burned). Elaborate machinery is then introduced to 
„pick out‟ the right sense in the right context, and all in a 
well-typed compositional logic. But this approach presup-
poses that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of 
the word „book‟ in ordinary language. What we suggest, 
instead, is that „copredication‟ is not different from meton-
ymy, as in both cases we are trying to „pick-up‟ for some 
concept a some other unmentioned concept b along with 
the most salient relation between them. To illustrate this 
point further, let us first consider the interpretation of Jon 
bought and studied Das Kapital: 
 
(33)  〚Jon bought and studied Das Kapital〛  
   (
1
Jon :: thing)(
1
DasKapital :: book) 
    (a1 :: activity)(a2 :: activity) 
      (STUDYING(a1)  SUBJECT(a1, Jon :: human)  
             OBJECT(a1, DasKapital :: infContent) 
       BUYING(a2)  SUBJECT(a2, Jon :: human) 
       OBJECT(a2, DasKapital :: physical)) 
 
That is, Jon bought a book that he also studied, where the 
object of the buying activity must be an object of type 
physical, and the object of a studying is some infCon-
tent. The type unifications of Jon and the physical 
book DasKapital are straightforward:  
 
(Jon :: (human ● thing))  
 (Jon :: human)  
 
(DasKapital :: (physical ● book))  
 (DasKapital :: book) 
 
However, the object of the studying activity, which is a 
book, must be an infContent object when being read. 
In the absence of „local‟ options, for these two types to uni-
fy the most salient relation between book and infCon-
tent is picked-up, introducing in the process a new varia-
ble of type infoc that is related to a book: HASCON-
TENT(DasKapital, x :: infoc). The final translation is thus: 
 
(34)   〚Jon bought and studied Das Kapital〛  
    (
1
Jon :: human)(
1
DasKapital :: book) 
    (a1 :: activity)(a2 :: activity))(x :: infoc)  
    (STUDYING(a1)  SUBJECT(a1, Jon)  OBJECT(a1, x)  
     BUYING(a2)  SUBJECT(a2,Jon)  OBJECT(a2,DasKapital)  
     HASCONTENT(DasKapital, x)) 
 
That is, Jon bought and studied Das Kapital describes a 
situation where there is a unique object named Jon, an ob-
ject of type human, and some book titled DasKapital (that 
Jon bought), and where DasKapital has the infContent 
x (that Jon studied).  
 It is important to note at this stage that hidden (and im-
plicitly assumed) information is either obtained by straight 
forward type unification or, when all attempts fail, by pick-
ing up some salient property or relation between the ob-
jects in the discourse. On the other hand, unwanted mean-
ings (as in lexical disambiguation, or removing some am-
biguities related to nominal modification) are obtained 
when certain type unifications fail. 
 Another important point that we like to make here is that 
copredication, the name given for the phenomenon exem-
plified by (34), is not much different from what is known 
by metonymy, in that type unification is the process by 
what which an indirect reference or some salient relation 
are discovered. Consider for example the following:  
 
(34)  〚The omelet wants a beer〛  
   (
1
oml :: omelet)(b :: beer)(a :: activity) 
   (WANTING(a)  SUBJECT(a, oml :: human) 
       OBJECT(a, b :: thing)) 
 
In this case, resolving the situation of „what is wanted‟ is 
quite simple: the object of wanting is an object of type 
thing, and more specifically, a beer, which works very 
well: (b :: (beer ● thing))  (b :: beer). However, it is 
the subject of the wanting that seems to be the problem: 
„want‟ expects a human subject but we found an object of 
type omelet. Clearly, these two types must somehow be 
reconciled. Since no subsumption relation exists between 
these types, an attempt at finding some salient relation be-
tween them is made. As it turns out, there is a salient rela-
tionship between a human and food (a supertype of ome-
let), namely the eat relation, that will necessarily intro-
duce an (implicit) object of type human. Thus, 
 
(35)   〚The omelet wants a beer〛   
    (1oml :: omelet)(b :: beer)(a1 :: activity) 
     (a2 :: activity)(x :: human) 
     (EATING(a2)  SUBJECT(a2, x)  OBJECT(a2, oml) 
 WANTING(a1)  SUBJECT(a1, x)  OBJECT(a1, b)) 
 
That is, there is some EATING and some WANTING that is 
going on (by some „discovered‟ x), and the object of the 
EATING is an omelet, and the subject of the EATING, who 
is a human, wants a beer. 
The Ontology of Natural Language 
Throughout this paper we have assumed the existence of 
some ontological structure, an ontological structure the 
types of which are assumed to be embedded in predicates 
(the properties of and the relations between objects of vari-
ous types). However, a valid question that one might ask is 
the following: how does one arrive at this ontological 
structure that implicitly underlies all that we say in every-
day discourse? One plausible answer is the (seemingly cir-
cular) suggestion that the semantic analysis of natural lan-
guage should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this 
regard we strongly agree with Dummett (1991) who states:  
 
We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions 
first, and then construct a meaning-theory in light of the 
answers. We should investigate how our language actually 
functions, and how we can construct a workable systemat-
ic description of how it functions; the answers to those 
questions will then determine the answers to the meta-
physical ones. 
 
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that 
in our effort to understand the complex and intimate rela-
tionship between ordinary language and everyday (com-
monsense) knowledge, one could, as Bateman (1995) has 
also suggested, „„use language as a tool for uncovering the 
semiotic ontology of commonsense‟‟ since language is the 
only theory we have of everyday knowledge. To alleviate 
this seeming circularity (in assuming this ontological struc-
ture in our semantic analysis; while at the same time sug-
gesting that semantic analysis of language should itself be 
used to uncover this ontological structure), we suggest per-
forming semantic analysis from the ground up, assuming a 
minimal (almost a trivial and basic) ontology, building up 
the ontology as we go guided by the results of the semantic 
analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) the on-
tology thus constructed as a result of this process would 
not be invented, as is the case in most approaches to ontol-
ogy (e.g., Guarino, 1995, Lenat & Guha, 1990, and Sowa, 
1995), but would instead be discovered from what is in fact 
implicitly assumed in our use of language in everyday dis-
course; (ii) the semantics of several natural language phe-
nomena should as a result become trivial, since the seman-
tic analysis was itself the source of the underlying 
knowledge structures (in a sense, one could say that the 
semantics would have been done before we even started!) 
 Another promising technique that can be used to „boot-
up‟ this ontological structure is performing some corpus 
analysis to initially obtain sets of monadic predicates that 
seem to be (sensibly) used in the predication of some very 
general types (e.g., artifact, event, physical, 
state, etc.) A subset relationship analysis can then be 
used to discover the hidden hierarchical structure. A simi-
lar approach has been suggested in Saba (2010). 
Concluding Remarks 
Most of the challenges in the semantics of natural language 
seem to be related to the phenomenon of the „missing text‟ 
– that is, text is almost never explicitly stated but is implic-
itly assumed as shared background knowledge. In this pa-
per we suggested how such commonsense knowledge 
might be „uncovered‟ in the process of language under-
standing. In particular, we suggested that the answer lies in 
rectifying what we believe was an oversight in logical se-
mantics, namely not distinguishing between two funda-
mentally different types of concepts: (i) ontological con-
cepts that correspond to types in a strongly-typed ontology; 
and (ii) logical concepts, that correspond to the properties 
of and the relations between objects of various ontological 
types. We showed how in such a framework a number of 
challenges in the semantics of natural language can be ad-
equately and systematically treated. 
 Several other linguistic phenomena intensionality (e.g., 
intensional verbs, intensional adjectives, etc.), or reasoning 
with abstract objects compound nominals, quantifier scope 
ambiguity, etc., were not dealt with in this paper as that 
would require some minor extension to our formalism and 
would thus extend the paper considerably. These and a 
more detailed presentation of some of the subjects covered 
in this paper are forthcoming. Much is left to be done, re-
fined, and restated, of course, especially as it relates to the 
„discovery‟ of that ontological structure that seems to be 
implicit in everything we say in our everyday discourse.  
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